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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the situation of welfare claimants, often constructed as faulty citizens 
and flawed welfare subjects. Many are on the receiving end of complex, multi-layered forms 
of surveillance aimed at securing socially responsible and compliant behaviours. In Australia, 
as in other Western countries, neoliberal economic regimes with their harsh and often 
repressive treatment of welfare recipients operate in tandem with a burgeoning and costly 
arsenal of CCTV and other surveillance and governance assemblages. The Australian 
Government’s Centrelink BasicsCard is but one example of welfare surveillance, whereby a 
percentage of a welfare claimant’s allowances must be spent on ‘approved’ items. The 
BasicsCard which has perhaps slipped under the radar of public discussion and is expanding 
nationally, raises significant questions about whether it is possible to encourage people to 
take responsibility for themselves if they no longer have real control over the most important 
aspects of their lives. Resistance and critical feedback, particularly from Indigenous people, 
points to a loss of dignity around the imposition of income management, operational 
complexity and denial of individual agency in using the BasicsCard, alongside the 
contradiction of apparently becoming ‘self-reliant’ through being income managed by the 
welfare state. 
This article highlights the lack of solid evidence for the implementation/imposition of the 
BasicsCard and points to the importance of developing critically based research to inform the 
enactment of evidence based policy, also acting as a touchstone for governmental 
accountability. In highlighting issues around the BasicsCard this paper makes a contribution 
to the largely under discussed area of income management and the growth of welfare 
surveillance in Australia.  
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Introduction  
In Australia, reframing welfare governance systems and employment promotion appeals to a 
rejuvenated neoliberal and paternalistic understanding of welfare governance (Lantz and 
Marston 2012). At the core of this rationality is a focus on bureaucratic, instead of human 
factors and measurable rational-technocratic procedures and interventions to ensure 
compliance and to move welfare recipients into job-search training and employment. Welfare 
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surveillance technologies and investigation strategies are at the heart of this policy suite, 
expanding the ways the state creates ‘deviants’ out of those who fail to be ‘good market 
citizens’ (Monahan 2008, Maki 2011).  
This paper considers some of the implications of the expansion of welfare surveillance in 
Australia. We begin by briefly outlining the backdrop to welfare-to-work policies including a 
discussion of recent welfare reforms in the context of ‘activation’ and surveillance. We then 
focus on The BasicsCard, implemented without clear evidence of benefit or even its ability to 
achieve stated welfare reform outcomes. In this context, the BasicsCard can thus be 
considered as yet another paternalistic monitoring and surveillance program, deployed to 
secure socially and morally responsible behaviours from some of the most disadvantaged 
individuals and communities in Australia.  
 
Background: Governing welfare in Australia 
Over the past decade, there have been substantial reforms to the social welfare system in 
Australia. Similar to other Anglophone countries, an income support system with limited 
obligations on the unemployed has been replaced by a system deeply entwined with the 
market centred philosophy of neoliberalism and the paternalism of social conservatism 
(Schram et al. 2010).  
This system of governance is unequivocally focused on moving income support recipients 
from ‘welfare to work’ through government sanctioned job-search training and eventual 
employment. In line with the OECD’s recommendations, measures are now in place to target 
and regulate new recipients, restrict eligibility to benefits and enforce ‘work availability’ 
requirements for receiving benefits, with sanctions for non-compliance (Lantz and Marston 
2012). At the heart of this policy frame, the neoliberal workfare project takes an active 
stance, emphasising the need to instil specific work ready competencies and the adoption of 
productivist ideologies in order to assimilate individuals into market relations (Bessant et al. 
2006). These strategies focus primarily on bureaucratic, rather than human factors with an 
emphasis on measurable technocratic procedures, compliance and managerial risk 
management, investigation strategies and surveillance practices. 
The Australian Government made it clear in the 2011-12 Federal Budget that it seeks to end 
the ‘corrosive’ effects of welfare through ‘requiring responsibility’ noting the importance of 
the ‘dignity and purpose of work’ (Gillard 2011:5). Invariably, the policy paradigm requires 
individual responsibility, and enacts punitive responses to control those people who are 
perceived as failing to contribute economically. In an inversion of the much feared ‘nanny 
state’ a ‘new paternalism’ has emerged through income management in targeted areas of 
substantial economic and social disadvantage, underpinned by a costly bureaucratic 
surveillance, monitoring and sanctioning infrastructure (Buckmaster, 2011).  
A central strategy emerging has been to ‘support or induce the adoption of more responsible 
behaviours in particular communities by, for example, placing conditions on eligibility for 
welfare payments or on how welfare payments may be spent’ (Buckmaster 2011:1).These 
measures are an indication of the Government’s growing commitment to the role of personal 
behavioural change in overcoming disadvantage. It is notable that several of the measures 
involve interventions in identified disadvantaged communities. This reflects growing interest 
on the part of the Government in ‘location based initiatives’ or programs targeting cluster 
groups in particular geographical locations (Buckmaster 2011:3).  
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New Paternalism – surveillance processes and practices shaping compliance  
A number of western democratic countries are ‘surveillance societies’ (Lyon 2001). The 
nature of the surveillance is complex and far-reaching and needs to be understood in the 
broadest context of everyday human acts, including shopping with loyalty cards, paying for 
goods with a swipe card (or BasicsCard), using a mobile phone, paying utility bills, 
interfacing with any level of government, logging on to computers or using the internet, etc. 
Surveillance as information gathering and storage is not a feature only of modernity or post 
modernity. A ‘simple and ancient’ form of data compilation may be discerned in England in 
the 1500s, in taxation, census and early poor law administration. This inaugural moment in 
the creation of the information state, while delineating limited rights to private property and 
parish poor relief, also built an infrastructure for social control, for example, over religious 
orders and workers organising for better pay and conditions (Lyon 2002). 
The use of surveillance by welfare authorities is not therefore a new phenomenon and have 
included Job Capacity Assessments for people with disabilities to establish their capacity to 
work and Activity Agreements which outline recipient’s contractual obligations and possible 
sanctions if they fail to comply (Lantz and Marston 2012). The availability, sophistication 
and reach of surveillance tools have been widened and accelerated with the use of cameras, 
data capturing techniques, loyalty cards, and the BasicsCard a PIN-operated Eftpos card, 
amounting to ‘dataveillance’ (Maki 2011). 
These growing surveillance techniques reflect a range of contradictions within neoliberal 
workfare policy. Henman and Marston (2008:194) note that ‘...the liberal principles of 
freedom of choice and individual liberties are suspended for populations receiving certain 
forms of welfare’. Mandatory workfare programs suggest that welfare recipients are not 
‘responsible’ enough to become self-sufficient independent workers on their own instead they 
require constant supervision and surveillance from authorities.  
While researchers argue that surveillance is not inherently designed to perpetuate inequality, 
they also note that in contemporary society, where everyone is subject to some forms of 
surveillance ‘not everyone is monitored in the same way or for the same purposes’ (Gilliom 
2001; Henman 2004; Haggerty & Ericson, 2006). Welfare surveillance scholars argue that 
surveillance is more than just watching, it is ‘a calculated practice for managing and 
manipulating human behaviour’ (Henman 2004:176). Maki (2011:51) notes of welfare 
surveillance in the UK, ‘...surveillance is not benign and, in the service of the neoliberal state, 
acts as a direct assault on the poor’. 
 Different forms of surveillance affect different populations in that the affluent may choose to 
be involved in market research, while the poor, in accessing services, encounter ‘invasive 
scrutiny of their purchases and discipline of their behaviour’ (Monahan 2008:220). 
The central core of neoliberalism can be found in the ’privatisation of public programs and 
services, the re-scripting of citizens as consumers and the corresponding increase in social 
control mechanisms, especially for those who do not neatly fit into the category of consumer-
citizen‘ such as people on welfare payments (Monahan 2008:219). The exercise of surveillant 
authority (particularly through the Stronger Futures legislation) demonstrates the new 
paternalism of ‘government as by a benign parent’ or ‘the notion that those in positions of 
power have, just as in the relationship between parents and children, the right and the 
obligation to overrule the preferences of those deemed incapable of knowing their true 
interests’ (Thomas and Buckmaster 2010:2). 
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Institutionalising Welfare Surveillance - The BasicsCard 
The BasicsCard is an example of a relatively new, geographically targeted and individualized 
surveillance program explicitly aimed at addressing behavioural change. First introduced 
under the then Howard Government in 2007 to many aboriginal communities in the Northern 
Territory Emergency Response (NTER) it operates by quarantining a proportion of a person’s 
welfare payments to a specialised account. Responsible behaviour is ‘induced’ with a Basics 
Shopping Card holding a large percentage of a welfare claimant’s allowances to be spent on 
‘approved’ items (Buckmaster 2011:2). This money can only be used to purchase ‘essentials’ 
such as food, clothing, and expenditure on housing, but as small businesses in Alice Springs 
discovered it can also be used to buy fireworks in one store but not schoolbags in another 
(Aikman 2012). The proportion ‘managed’ is generally 50%, but may be up to 70%. 
Generally, 100% of any lump sum payments (such as the Baby Bonus) are quarantined. A 
minimum spend of $5 in any transaction is required (ACCOS 2010).  
With only specific shops licensed by Centrlink to accept the BasicsCard, many small retailers 
are not included in the scheme, which forces welfare recipients to shop at the larger retail 
chains such as Coles and Woolworths and their subsidiaries. Buckmaster (2011) notes that 
these are the very same organisations that have significant control over small businesses, 
local suppliers and producers.  
Research has been limited as to the operations and impacts of the BasicsCard despite its 
continued expansion. One of the only reports specifically examining the experiences of more 
than 180 women on income management (or ‘welfare quarantining’) in the Northern 
Territory (NT) reveals a number of significant problems with the system. The majority of 
participants wanted to exit the BasicsCard system for a range of reasons including a lack of 
understanding as to the purpose of the program and why they are on it, a perception that both 
Centrelink and their community do not respect them and consider them to be incapable and 
incompetent in managing their money and family’s lives, that they, and their children, were 
losing important money management skills while Centrelink took over the payment of their 
bills, that their children were being taught to rely on government welfare and also the 
perception that the BasicsCard was specifically intended for Aboriginal or African migrant 
families alone (Equality Rights Alliance, 2011). 
Research participants also argued that the BasicsCard shaped their spending in negative 
ways, noting that the big supermarkets, rather than smaller shops, accepted the Basics Card. 
This was an issue for participants looking for Halal butchers or Asian grocers, buying clothes 
for school-aged children and accessing prescription medications. Some of the smaller shops 
had cheaper options, but the BasicsCard did not allow them to shop there. Participants also 
noted that they had no avenue to leave the scheme (Equality Rights Alliance, 2011). 
Despite the lack of research and to date no evaluation of the BasicsCard the decision to 
extend income management into metropolitan areas has gone somewhat unnoticed. The first 
five ‘Place Based Income Management’ locations include from July 1 2012: Bankstown, 
(NSW), Logan, (Qld), Rockhampton, (Qld), Playford, (SA) and Shepparton (Vic). In 
addition, Kwinana in Western Australia, one of the other trial sites, has had Child Protection 
and Voluntary Income Management in place since April 2009 (Buckmaster and Ey 2012:3). 
The government has targeted these areas because of their ‘entrenched disadvantage’. The 
BasicsCard scheme, which is supported by both the Federal Government and Opposition, 
comes at a significant cost. Estimates provided by the Government indicate the new trials will 
cost $117 million over 5 years. The Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) has noted, 
for example, that the NT scheme (total expenditure of $402 million over 5 years) and 
covering about 20,000 individuals, amounts to a cost of $4,100 per person. Put in perspective, 
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this is one third of the Newstart Allowance paid to unemployed people over a year ($11,600 
per annum), or 8 times the amount provided to employment service providers to address 
barriers to work for long-term unemployed people ($500 per annum). ACOSS argues that this 
money would be better spent on increasing services and expanding employment opportunities 
(ACOSS, 2010). 
While the Government is committed to expanding the policy of income management across 
Australia there is little evidence that income management meets their intended welfare-to -
work outcomes, including ‘better management of finances in the long term’, moving people 
into employment, or reducing unemployment or long term reliance on welfare payments. 
Research on nutrition in Northern Territory communities by the Menzies School of Health 
Research found that in the 10 stores surveyed: ‘Income management independent of the 
government stimulus payment appears to have had no beneficial effect on tobacco and 
cigarette sales, soft drink or fruit and vegetable sales’ (Brimblecombe et al, 2010:549). 
In response to the continuation of the income management scheme despite their research, the 
authors wrote: 
We are the co-authors of a study published today in the Medical Journal of Australia, 
which shows that the federal government’s income management policy is not making 
an impact on tobacco and health food sales in remote community shops in the NT. 
Smoking and poor diet are responsible for much of the health gap between indigenous 
and other Australians. We are concerned that indigenous affairs minister Jenny 
Macklin has responded to our study by highlighting the results of the government’s 
evaluation. She has just told journalists that the government intends to press ahead 
with plans to roll out income management more broadly, and has appeared to dismiss 
our findings (Brimblecombe & Thomas, 2010). 
Researcher Jon Altman also made comment: 
The Australian government is clearly embarrassed by these research findings for three 
reasons. First, $82.8 million have just been committed in the 2010/11 Budget to create 
a new scheme for income management, an investment in a process to regulate the 
behaviour of welfare recipients in the NT. All up $410.5 million will be committed in 
six years to what might prove an entirely unproductive expenditure. Second, 
legislation is about to be tabled in the federal parliament predicated on an assumption 
that income management is good for Indigenous (and other) subjects in the NT, 
something this research seriously questions. Third, the Rudd government has 
remained firmly wedded to this intervention measure since its election in November 
2007; saying sorry for others ‘historical’ errors is clearly politically easier than saying 
sorry for your own ‘path dependant’ acquiescence and possible mistakes. (Altman in 
Priest & Cox, 2010) 
The Government’s enthusiasm amounting to myopia for income management also runs 
counter to the recommendations of the independent Northern Territory Emergency Response 
review committee established by the Government, in particular, its recommendation that the 
compulsory income management scheme should cease and be replaced by a combination of 
voluntary and targeted trigger-based systems (for example, in cases of child neglect). The 
Committee’s recommendations included:  
 The current blanket application of compulsory income management in the Northern 
Territory cease;  
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 Income management to be available on a voluntary basis to community members who 
choose to have some of their income quarantined for specific purposes, as determined 
by them;  
 Compulsory income management should only apply on the basis of child protection, 
school enrolment and attendance and other relevant behavioural triggers. These 
provisions should apply across the Northern Territory;  
 All welfare recipients to have access to external merits review.’ (Yu et al, 2010) 
There are also a number of other reports and reviews which raise clear concerns about 
compulsory income management and question the positive benefits claimed by the 
Government (Priest & Cox, 2010; Buckmaster & Ey, 2012). Data captured about welfare 
purchasing ‘choices’ made by BasicsCard holders may be substantial, but information about 
how and where this data is retained and how it may be accessed, requires further 
investigation. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper suggests that the ideological framework driving welfare-to-work has become 
punitive and deficit oriented, focusing on the shortcomings or ‘flaws’ of individuals and 
families. Systems of surveillance continue to be expanded and performance measurement and 
assessment strategies, investigation and surveillance practices reinforce a deficit-oriented 
framework focused on perceived individual or family failings (Maki 2011). It is clear that the 
intense shift to a more technological surveillance oriented system deserves closer attention.  
The BasicsCard is an example of a system implemented with little adequate research related 
to its effectiveness or otherwise of income management despite the government consistently 
emphasising the importance of evidence-based policy making (Buckmaster & Ey, 2012). 
Administrative costs are also high and a question persists as to whether it is possible to 
encourage people to take responsibility for themselves if they do not have real control over 
important aspects of their lives, with possible negative mental health outcomes.  
Moreover, targeting personal behaviour by withholding income payments is inconsistent with 
the rights-based approach to income support that has been a feature of welfare policy in 
Australia since World War II (Kennedy 1982). 
Researchers and community organisations note that the current shift towards paternalistic 
income management system cannot fix complex social problems through vindictive social 
measures (Priest & Cox, 2010). A quote from Elliot’s Submission to the Northern Territory 
Emergency Response Review is apt here: 
There are no mysteries why some things work in the bush and others do not. A sad 
fact of life is that not all communities are going to be ‘saved’, but what is clear is that 
community control is fundamental to any changes that will take place for better 
outcomes for the people, not one size fits all’ (cited in Priest & Cox, 2010:87).	
The Northern Territory Emergency Response has been deeply controversial since its 
inception and its recent extension by the Gillard Government for another ten years only 
exacerbates a growing sense of injustice, particularly about the limited and ambiguous 
evidence base supporting income management. Australia is the only country in the world to 
impose such a scheme on its poorest citizens, in this way (Buckmaster & Ey, 2012). 
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